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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear this appeal in an order dated July 6, 2016. This was done pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), which gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over a
ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals.
II. GOVERNING CONSTRUCTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
A.

UTAH CODE § 31A-21-108. Subrogation actions.

Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured.
B.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-107. Survival of action for injury or death
to person.

A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death
of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action
against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for
special and general damages.
C.

Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part):

(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
1

substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of additional facts. Appellee Wilson accepts Appellant Educators Mutual
Insurance Association’s (hereinafter “EMIA”) statement of facts and adds the following
facts:
In 2011, Wilsons filed a wrongful death lawsuit as her heirs seeking compensation
for their loss of Jessica’s companionship and burial expenses. (No Personal
Representative was sought or appointed for Jessica’s estate.) R. at 478.
In 2013, Wilsons reached a tentative settlement for the $100,000 limits of
Krueger’s liability insurance limits, subject to resolution of EMIA’s claim of a federal
ERISA lien. R at 480.
In January, 2014, EMIA filed its own competing suit against Krueger, the driver of
the car which struck Jessica. In its Complaint, EMIA sued Krueger, alleging that his
“failure to exercise reasonable care caused his vehicle to strike Jessica Wilson,” causing
her severe injuries and death. EMIA alleged that Krueger “is liable for all damages
arising out of this action, including medical expenses incurred by Jessica Wilson, and
claimed its insurance contract with Jessica Wilson gave it a right of reimbursement. R. at
775, attached as Addendum D. EMIA did not pay all of Jessica Wilson’s medical
expenses. See payments ledger in Addendum D.
Unable to resolve the competing claims, the parties stipulated to consolidation of
2

the two cases, an assignment of Krueger’s defenses against the EMIA claim to Wilsons,
and an interpleader of Krueger’s $100,000 liability policy limits. R. at 263.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The substance of the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals is that,
MIA should have brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate
or intervened in the Wilsons' action against Krueger (citation omitted).
Instead, it filed an action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit.

Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471.
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument of EMIA - that Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-21-108, “Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of
its insured,” expressly authorized an insurer to sue in its own name. The court ruled there
is “no language” in the statute “granting an insurance company the right to bring a
subrogation action in its own name.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8 (italics in original).
The court also correctly presumed that § 31A-21-108 is not “the exclusive method” to
bring a (subrogation) action. Id.
EMIA and National Association of Subrogation Professionals (hereinafter
"AMICUS") do not argue that the statute is ambiguous. AMICUS, in fact, reads the
statute precisely that way the Court of Appeals reads it: “The plain meaning of Section
31A-21-108 is obvious. An insurer may pursue a subrogation action in the insured’s
name.” (AMICUS Brief, p. 9.) However, EMIA and AMICUS fault the court for not
seeing that the plain meaning of statue permits the “insurer to sue in its own name.”
EMIA and AMICUS seem to argue that the statute must read that way because insurers
3

file subrogation cases. However, because the common law did not allow subrogation of
injury or death claims, Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 104
(1944), injury subrogation does not exist except in compliance with § 31A-21-108, “by
the insurer in the name of its insured,” Id. WILSONS’ exhaustive search of Utah case law
shows no reported case in Utah history in which an insurer sued a tortfeasor for injury
damages in the name of the insurer.
EMIA has cited to several cases in support of its argument that Utah Code Ann. §
31A-21-108 authorizes an insurer to sue in its own name. None of these cases interprets
§ 31A-21-108. And, none allows an insurer which has not paid the debt of the wrongdoer
in full to sue the wrongdoer in its own name except for workers’ compensation injuries
which are governed by statutes which expressly give standing to workers’ compensation
insurer. See Wilson 2016 UT App 38, fn. 4 (quoting the current workers’ compensation
statute).
The Court of Appeals is correct that Utah case law does not give an insurer a right
to sue in its own name unless it has fully paid the damages for which the wrongdoer could
be liable. This has been the law of Utah for over one hundred years, and is the general
rule throughout the United States. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
912 P2d 983 (Utah 1996) and other cases, the Utah appellate courts have described the
conditions which allow and insurer to sue in its own name. EMIA failed to meet the
condition which requires that “the entire debt must have been paid,” referring to the debt

4

owed by the tortfeasor to the injured insured. Id. at 986.
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case does not leave insurers like EMIA and
AMICUS without a remedy or protection. Nothing in Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, creates
new law, and insurers like EMIA and AMICUS have the same rights they have had for
decades.
AMICUS misreads the Court of Appeals reading of the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 as always requiring the insured to be made whole first.
However, § 31A-21-108 does not require the insured to be made whole. The doctrine that
an injured party should be made “made whole” before a subrogated insurer can recover
on its claim was argued below, Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 5, but the issue was never
reached because of the Court’s ruling on EMIA’s standing. Id. at ¶ 7. This case is not a
test of the made whole doctrine.
EMIA and AMICUS misread Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, as interpreted by the
Court of Appeals, as preventing the insurer from protecting its rights by joining in a case.
They err. The purpose of § 31A-21-108 is to create “one action,” not to prevent an insurer
from protecting its rights. Neither § 31A-21-108 nor the Court of Appeals’ opinion nor
any other Utah case prevents an insurer from also appearing in the case. The Court of
Appeals recognized the important right of an insurer to protect its rights by intervening in
a case in its own name. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 12. AMICUS has raised some
important policy arguments that a property insurer should be able to protect its
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subrogation rights in its own name. This essential right to join any case which may
involve subrogation issues as an intervening party meets the needs EMIA and AMICUS
describe. EMIA’s problem in this case is that for more than three years (see Statement of
Facts) it ignored its right to intervene in the Wilson wrongful death case and then filed its
own competing “action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit.” Wilson, 2016
UT App 38 at ¶ 12.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107, Utah’s
survival statute for injury and death, which passed Jessica Wilson’s cause of action
against Krueger on her death to her estate personal representative and heirs. Th cause of
action included the right to recover Jessica’s medical expenses.
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS address the applicability and meaning of § 78B-3107. Instead, they complain that the Court of Appeals deprived insurers of any rights
when their insurer dies. They vaguely argue, without support, that the Court of Appeals
should have applied Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 to give the insurer the right to sue in
its own name after the death of its insured. Neither EMIA nor AMICUS explain how the
general authority to sue in the name of an insurer in § 31A-21-108 should control over the
express provisions for survival of injury and death actions in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3107. EMIA could have, but did not, protect its rights through participating through Jessica
Wilson’s estate or by intervening in the wrongful death action. “To entitle one to
subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong, as equity will, in general, relieve
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only those who could not have relieved themselves.” Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah 1995) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 786 (1972).
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prevents dismissal of a case without
giving a reasonable time for substitution of the real party in interest. This rule does not
apply in this case. This is an interpleader case which arose from the settlement and
dismissal of the parties’ separate and competing cases against the tortfeaser, Krueger.
When the Court of Appeals remanded “with instructions for the trial court to dismiss
EMIA's claims and award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons,” the dismissal was
because EMIA had lacked standing in the prior case it had filed against Krueger. Wilson,
2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 13. Without standing in the prior case, EMIA has no claim on the
funds in this interpleader action.
V. ARGUMENT
A. The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted § 31A-21-108. Neither
APPELLANT nor AMICUS nor Utah case law offers a different interpretation.
Petitioner EMIA and AMICUS both fault the Utah Court of Appeals for
incorrectly interpreting this fourteen word statute: “Subrogation actions may be brought
by the insurer in the name of its insured.” Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108. (EMIA Brief.
pp. 9-10; AMICUS Brief, p. 3.)
The Utah Court of Appeals found “no language” in the statute “...granting an
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insurance company the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name.” Wilson, 2016
UT App 38, ¶ 8 (italics in original). EMIA and AMICUS call this ruling “untenable.”
(EMIA Brief, p. 24; AMICUS Brief, p. 4.) AMICUS writes that the Court of Appeals
“read words into the statute which simply do not exist,” and the “clear language used in
this statute without question should allow for an insurer to file suit in subrogation in its
own name. There is simply no other reasonable way to interpret this statute.” (AMICUS
brief, p. 3.)
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS argues that the statute is ambiguous, and neither
offers a contrary interpretation. AMICUS, in fact, reads the statute precisely the way the
Court of Appeals reads it: “The plain meaning of Section 31A-21-108 is obvious. An
insurer may pursue a subrogation action in the insured’s name.” (AMICUS brief, p. 9, the
agreeable conclusion of a well-researched, five-page argument.)
Neither EMIA nor AMICUS has cited a single Utah case which interprets § 31A21-108 differently. As the Court of Appeals and AMICUS agree, there is no language in §
31A-21-108 granting an insurer the right to sue in its own name.
EMIA argues for a different interpretation of § 31A-21-108 “because the right for
an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law.” (EMIA Breif, p. 9.) This
characterization of the common law is only partly correct. Common law allowed
subrogation of property claims, but not claims for injury or death. In Utah “...common
law there was no right of subrogation in an insurance carrier against a third person for
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personal injury or death of an insured.” Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
152 P.2d 98, 104 (1944). This suggests that § 31A-21-108 is the only authority for a
subrogated insurer to sue the wrongdoer for personal injuries, and only in compliance
with the statute, “by the insurer in the name of its insured.” Id. WILSONS’ exhaustive
search of Utah case law shows no reported case in Utah history in which an insurer sued a
tortfeasor for injury damages in the name of the insurer.
The Court of Appeals assumed, correctly, that § 31-21-108 was not “the exclusive
method” to bring a (subrogation) action. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 8. EMIA and
AMICUS seem to agree. Their real arguments seem to lay elsewhere - that the law cannot
mean what it says because an insurer must be able to file a subrogation action in its own
name. The proper course for bringing a Utah subrogation action is discussed below.
B. The Court of Appeals is correct that Utah case law does not give an
insurer a right to sue in its own name unless it has fully paid the damages for which
the wrongdoer could be liable.
EMIA’S and AMICUS’ criticism of the Court of Appeals is not supported by
Utah case law. Utah law does allow an insurer to sue in its own name, but not in this case.
1. Utah law does allow an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name
but only under narrow conditions. As early as 1946, the Utah Supreme Court declared
rules which will allow a subrogated insurer to sue in its own name. In Cook v. Cook, the
Plaintiff paid the insurance premiums on a life insurance policy and claimed a
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subrogation right to the proceeds. Cook v. Cook, 110 Utah 406, 410 174 P. 2d 434 (1946).
In its analysis, the Court identified conditions which entitle a party claiming subrogation
to sue in its own name. Id. at 410.
The Utah Supreme Court in State Farm v. Northwestern National crystalized the
factors identified in Cook into four elements:
Before a court will grant relief in a subrogation action, a party must meet
the following requirements: (1) There must be a debt or obligation for
which the subrogee was not primarily liable; (2) the subrogee must have
made payment to protect his own rights or interest; (3) the subrogee must
not have acted merely as a volunteer; and (4) the entire debt must have been
paid. Furthermore, subrogation must not work any injustice to the rights of
others.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983, 986 (Utah 1996).
The fourth element of State Farm v. Northwestern National, that “the entire debt
must have been paid,” supports the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case as described in
the next argument.
2. The Court of Appeals was correct. EMIA did not meet the test for suing in its own
name because, inter alia, it had not paid the entire debt of the wrongdoer. EMIA does not
dispute that it paid only part (some of the medical expenses) of the debt the tortfeasor,
Krueger, owed to Jessica Wilson, the decedent and insured. Jessica’s estate could have
asserted “special and general damages” to include: pain and suffering; additional medical
expenses; burial and funeral expenses; and pain and suffering under Utah’s survival statute
for injury claims, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107. Having paid less than the tortfeasor owed
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Jessica’s estate, EMIA was not entitled to file the claim in its own name. The Court of
Appeals wrote:
Our review of Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception of
an insurer who has fully indemnified the insured for all damages for which
the wrongdoer could be held liable, see Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 103 (1944), no independent right exists for an
insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own name.
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 8.
While the Court of Appeals did not cite Johanson for its holding (see discussion of
EMIA’S criticism below), Johanson contains a good review of the general law - that an
insurer must pay the debt of the wrongdoer in full before the insurer has standing to sue the
wrongdoer directly.
As quoted from the State Farm case above, “the entire debt must have been paid” by
the subrogated insurer before the insurer could sue in its own name. State Farm, 912 P2d at
986. Other Utah cases support this rule. See Cook discussed above; Davis County v. Jensen,
2003 UT App 444, 83 P.3d 405, fn 5; and Featherstone v. Emerson 14 Utah 12, 45 Pac. 713
(1896) ("As a general rule, the right of subrogation cannot be enforced until the whole debt
is paid or tendered to the creditor.”). This has been the general American rule for over one
hundred years. See Payment of entire claim of third person as condition of subrogation, 9
A.L.R. 1596 (1920).
3. EMIA’S criticism of the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Co. is unfair, and the case does not authorize EMIA’s to sue a torfeasor in its own
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name. In a lengthy criticism of the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Co., EMIA tries to persuade this court that the Court of Appeals misapplied the
holding in the case and that Johanson actually supports EMIA’S position in that it has
standing in this case. (EMIA Brief, pp. 16-23.)
EMIA’S criticism of the Court of Appeals is unfair. The Court of Appeals’ citation
was “see Johanson v. Cudahy... .” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 8. The “see” signal
indicates that Johanson supports the proposition but does not directly state it. It is a signal
that the Court was not relying on the holding. See Colombia Law Review, Harvard Law
Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and The Yale Law Journal, The Blue Book
A Uniform System for Citation, 6, (Mary M. Prince ed., 19th ed. 2011).
In its analysis of Johanson, EMIA missed a critical point: the insurer in Johanson
had a statutory cause of action to sue in its own name. The additional facts below are
necessary to understand Johanson.
First, the cited 1944 opinion was the second appeal of the dispute, which had been
re-filed between the two opinions. The decision on the first appeal in 1941 states its
holding: “What this case decides is: The statutory cause of action in favor of the employer
or the carrier granted by 42- 1- 58, R.S.U. 1933 may be assigned.” Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Company, 101 Utah 219, 120 P.2d 281, 282 (1941) (the citation to the Revised
Statutes of Utah is to the workers compensation statute) (emphasis added).
Second, EMIA’s argument (EMIA Brief, p. 22) that the employer and its insurer in
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Johanson (1944) did not have statutory standing is wrong, as shown in the 1941 opinion.
EMIA’s misreading may come because the 1944 opinion quotes only portions of the statute
which omit the statutory case of action language. The statutory cause of action in the old
Utah statute was similar in substance to the present Utah workers compensation statute
quoted in Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at fn 4.
Third, the Johanson (1944) court surveyed three primary views in the different states
and rejected the view that the insured / injured party was the owner of the claim (EMIA
Brief, p. 18) because the Utah workers compensation statute gave statutory standing to the
insurer and employer. Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 104 (Utah 1944).
The Johanson (1944) survey of cases began with this preface, “Numerous cases from
twenty–four jurisdictions are cited. ...But when this right of subrogation was given by
statute as it is in Section 42––1––58 ...” Id. (emphasis added).
The statutory standing of the employer’s insurer in Johanson (1944) makes the
case inapplicable to EMIA’s arguments for standing in this case.
4. No Utah case supports the right of an insurer to sue the tortfeasor in the
insurers’ own name. The cases cited by EMIA do not support the right of an insurer to sue
the tortfeasor in the insurers’ own name. WILSONS make this bold claim: This case now
before the Court, Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471, is the first reported case in the
history of Utah in which an insurer has sued a tortfeasor in its own name for subrogation
of personal injury damages.
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The cases cited by EMIA are these:
Property damage case cited EMIA
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653 (1913),
cited by EMIA (EMIA Brief, p. 11, 12, 15, and 19) supports the Court of Appeals opinion
in this case, and is no help to EMIA. In that case, a fire insurer paid $250 of $600 damage
to barn and received assignment of claim against tortfeasor. In 1913 as now, Utah did not
allow subrogation of only part of a claim. As the Utah Supreme Court wrote, “In all of the
foregoing cases it is substantially held that an assignment of only a part of an entire
claim... is not enforceable by the assignee in an action at law.” Id. at 654. However, the
court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurer because the defendant failed to
object (special demurrer) to standing in its answer to the partial claim assignment. Id. at
658
Workers compensation cases cited by EMIA
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., discussed above.
Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77 (1938) cited by EMIA (EMIA Brief, p. 12 and 19) has
no precedential value because it was another workers compensation case with the same
statutory standing for the employer / insurer reviewed in the discussion of Johanson
above.
Cases of insurer suing insurer cited by EMIA
EMIA offers five cases to support its claim of standing to sue a tortfeasor in its
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own name. These are: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983
(Utah 1996) (EMIA Brief, p. 14 and 20); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (EMIA Brief, p. 15 and 20); Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995) (EMIA Brief, p. 14); State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (EMIA Brief, p. 13, 14, 20, and
21); and Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 377 P.2d 786
(Utah 1963) (EMIA Brief, p. 21).
These cases do not interpret Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, and they are not
subrogated injury claims against a tortfeasor. Every one of these cases involve an insurer
suing another insurer for contribution or for violation of subrogation liens. None are
personal injury subrogation cases and none were filed against the tortfeasor.
These cases exist because the Utah Supreme Court has carved out a special
standing rule allowing insurers to sue other insurers. In State Farm v. Northwestern the
Court wrote:
More significantly, we have extended this principle (equitable subrogation)
to an action by an insurer against a second insurance company which is
primarily liable to defend or pay any claims on behalf of its insured but
which has denied coverage. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty
Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786, 787-88 (Utah
1963).
State Farm v. Northwestern, 912 P2d 983 at ¶ 7.
None of these cases apply to EMIA’S standing problem in this case.
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Case of insurer suing recipient of its no-fault policy benefits cited by EMIA
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972) (EMIA Brief, p.
13 and 20). Barnes was a passenger in the car insured by Transamerica who collected
medical benefits from Transamerica, not a tortfeasor who owed injury damages to its
insured. Barnes settled with the tortfeasor driving another car without reimbursing
Transamerica. Transamerica sued, alleging Barnes violated its subrogation rights by
settling without notice to Transamerica. The case was remanded to decide if Barnes was
made whole. The case does not support EMIA’s right to sue a tortfeasor with whom it has
no relationship.
5. Serious issues of claim preclusion and res judicata would also arise if an insurer
is allowed to sue in its own name on part of the debt. A “single act causing simultaneous
injury to the physical person and property of one individual . . . give[s] rise to only one
cause of action, and not to separate causes based . . . on the personal injury, and . . . the
property loss." Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, ¶ 16, 259 P.3d 1049, quoting Raymer v.
Hi-Line Transp., Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427, 394 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1964). Thus,
adjudication of one the issues in an injury action will bar future actions on the same facts.
Id. An insurer suing on medical expenses or property damage can prevent the insured
from later suing for compensation for injuries.
These issues are eliminated by requiring he insurer to sue in the name of its insured
in a single action.
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C. The Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case does not leave insurers like
EMIA and AMICUS without a remedy or protection.
1. The Court of Appeals did not make new law. Nothing in Wilson, 2016 UT App
38 creates new law. The Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 by its plain
language. As described above in the discussion of Featherstone v. Emerson, the rule
against splitting a cause of action by suing on part of the debt owed the insurer goes back
more than a hundred years. Utah’s survival statute for personal injury claims, Utah Code
Ann. §78B-3-107, is also very old. Nothing about this opinion is surprising.
2. AMICUS misreads § 31A-21-108, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, as
always requiring the insured to be made whole first. AMICUS sees the issue here as
“whether an insured must be made whole before that insured’s insurance carrier has a
right of subrogation.” (AMICUS Brief, p. 2.)
The doctrine that an injured party should be made “made whole” before a
subrogated insurer can recover on its claim was argued below. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38
at ¶ 5. However, the issue was never reached because of the Court’s ruling on standing.
Id. at ¶ 7. This case is not a test of the made whole doctrine.
EMIA and AMICUS raise reasonable policy arguments - that in many property
damage actions, requiring an insured to be made whole first would create problems for
insurers. The cases cited by AMICUS are good illustrations of the problems facing
property insurers. However, the Utah “made whole” requirement can be easily overcome
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by property insurers. First, the right of an insured to be made whole can be modified in
the insurance contract. Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2005 UT App 395, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 696.
Second, the property insurer can become the assignee of the claim and sue in its own
name. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 137 P. 653, 655 (1913). In cases
where the insured is owed a deductible or has small damages, the insured can pay the
small deductible or otherwise receive an assigment of the cause of action and have
standing in its own right. To prevent the problems of uncooperative insureds, the insured
can also modify its insurance contract to provide for a purchase and assignment of the
claim under predetermined terms. See Birch, 2005 UT App 395 at ¶ 7.
Because the Utah Court of Appeals did not modify the law of subrogation, insurers
still have the benefits and protections they have been given in scores of Utah appellate
opinions.
3. EMIA and AMICUS misread § 31A-21-108, as interpreted by the Court of
Appeals, as preventing the insurer from protecting its rights by joining in a case. The
purpose of § 31A-21-108 is to create “one action,” not prevent insurers form protecting
their rights.
EMIA and AMICUS argue they should be able to sue in their own name as
insurers to protect their rights. As AMICUS writes, “ an insurer should have the ability to
file suit in its name (and not exclusively in the name of its policy holder) in litigation
against responsible third parties.” (AMICUS Brief, p. 2.) They blame their perceived loss
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of this ability on the Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108.
The short answer to these arguments is that neither the Court of Appeals opinion
nor the plain meaning of § 31A-21-108 requires the policy holder to be the exclusive
party in a case.
The purpose of § 31A-21-108 is to create “one action,” not prevent the insurer
from also becoming a party with its insured. The strong policy § 31A-21-108 is to
prevent the splitting of a cause of action, not to exclude an insurer from participating in
the case. In Johanson v. Cudahay (1944), this court explained the reason for the rule
requiring subrogation cases to be brought in the name of the insured.
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the
insurer and that the third party has a right not to have the cause of action
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions.
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the
insurance carrier. The principle of law is noted in Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. D. & R. G. R. Co., supra, 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653.
Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104.
4. Neither § 31A-21-108 nor the Court of Appeals opinion nor any other Utah case
prevents an insurer from also appearing in the case.
The Court of Appeals recognized the important right of an insurer to protect its
rights by joining in a case its own name. “EMIA should have brought its personal injury
action in the name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons' action against Krueger.
Instead, it filed an action in its own name, which Utah law does not permit.” Wilson,
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2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 12.
AMICUS illustrates its arguments by including its Complaint in AGCS Marine Ins.
Co. v. Adler Hot Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015)
(AMICUS Brief, p. 15, 27, 29 and Addendum D.)
This case, in which AMICUS is trying to protect iself by appearing in this case, is
a property loss case which appears to include all of the insured property owners as well as
their insurers as plaintiffs. If so, WILSONS see no issue here. If an insurer can intervene
in a case, WILSONS see no reason why the insurer cannot join its insured as an initial
plaintiff. The joinder of insureds and insurers protects all, and meets the purpose of Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 by not splitting the cause of action into multiple suits on the
same event and facts.
5. The holding of the Court of Appeals was narrow: EMIA could not filed its own
separate case and competing case in its own name on the same allegations of negligent
driving by Krueger.
The holding of the Court of Appeals was that EMIA had no right to file a separate
and competing action against the tortfeasor, Krueger, for negligent driving when a
separate action was already pending on the same facts. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38 at ¶ 12.
(For a more complete description of EMIA’s competting injury claim against Krueger see
Statement of Facts, and Addendum B.) Although the cases were consolidated for trial, the
cases remained separate because EMIA never sought to make itself a party in WILSONS’
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case. “Except where provided by statute, a consolidation in equity does not merge the
suits and they maintain their separate identity in so far as the parties, issues, and proof are
concerned.” Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 1992), quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions
§ 217, at 690 (1985).
The path for EMIA to protect its rights was clear.
D.

The court of appeals correctly applied § 78B-3-107 in ruling that

Jessica Wilson’s cause of action against the tortfeasor passed upon her death to her
estate personal representative or heirs.
EMIA writes that the “Court of Appeals has created a requirement that would
make it impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away.”
(EMIA Brief, p. 24.) No, the Utah Legislature created the requirement decades ago.
1.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona: injury causes of action die with the

person. Under common law, injury causes of action were personal and did not outlive the
injured person. Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 796 (1890). “At common
law, personal tort actions abate upon the death of either the claimant or the tortfeasor,
while tort claims for property damage or conversion survive.” Gressman v. State, 2013
UT 63, ¶ 7, 323 P.3d 998.
2. Without § 78B-3-107, all causes of action for Jessica Wilson’s injury and death
would have died with her.
Survival of personal tort actions is strictly under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107
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which reads:
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death
of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action
against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for
special and general damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (first enacted as U.C.A. 1953, §78-11-12).
3. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the right to recover pre-death
medical expenses passes under § 78B-3-107(1)(a) to the heirs and personal representative
on death. “After Jessica's death, her cause of action for personal injury passed to her
estate by virtue of Utah's survival statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B–3–107(1)(a). “The
survival statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured decedent the
right to pursue both “special and general damages” against the wrongdoer. General
damages include damages for the insured's pain and suffering... .” Wilson, 2016 UT App
38 at ¶ 12. “Pre-death medical expenses are part of an injury claim.” Morrison v. Perry,
140 P.2d 772 (Utah 1943).
WILSONS’ wrongful death suit was filed in 2011 (Statement of Facts). The parties
in that case reached a tentative settlement in 2013 for a payment of $100,000. In 2014,
EMIA rushed to file its competing Complaint against the tortfeasor, Krueger, for
negligent driving on the same allegations which had been pending for three years.
As the Court of Appeals wrote, EMIA had the right to either seek the appointment
of a Personal Representative or intervene in the WILSONS case. Wilson, 2016 UT App
22

38 at ¶ 12.
EMIA failed for three years to join the WILSON case when it had a legal right to
do so. “To entitle one to subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong, as equity
will, in general, relieve only those who could not have relieved themselves.” Educators
Mut., 890 P.2d at 1031 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 786
(1972).
4.

By its express terms, § 78B-3-107(1)(a) applies only to personal injury, not

to property claims. Unlike personal injury claims, property claims survived the death of
the insured under common law. Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶ 7 As described above,
a subrogated insurer of a property damage claim can obtain an assigment of the claim,
and can pursue legal action as the owner of the claim even after the death of the insured.
Even without an assignment, a subrogated insurer of a property claim for which it paid
the whole debt could also qualify to sue in its own name, even after the death of the
insured, meeting the requirements given in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l
Ins. Co., 912 P2d at 986.
E. URCP 17 has no application. Because of the interpleader nature of this
case, there is no ongoing litigation for the real party in interest to pursue.
The pertinent part of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
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substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
1.

The case in which the Court of Appeals found EMIA to have no standing was

the case it filed against Krueger, which was dismissed. That case was settled and
dismissed, and the settlement funds were placed in this interpleader case. The Court of
Appeals needed to resolve standing in that case to determine the interpleader rights
between EMIA and the WILSONS in this case.
EMIA has standing in this interpleader case to litigate its right to the interpleader
funds, but the Court of Appeals directed the trial court to dismiss EMIA from the
interpleader action because it lacked standing in the case it filed against Krueger.
2.

The right to have the real party in interest in the EMIA case belonged to

Krueger, the defendant in the EMIA case. The right did not belong to the Plaintiff who
lacked the standing. The right to have the real party in interest substituted into an action
belongs to the defendant in the action. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah
1980). Because the parties settled and dismissed the case against the tortfeasor, Krueger
(EMIA, Statement of the Case), there is no ongoing litigation for the real party in interest
to pursue and no defendant to protect.
3. EMIA had a reasonable time in its case against Krueger. EMIA had more than
“a reasonable time after objection” (URCP 17(a)) to substitute the real party in interest in
the trial court. In his pre-answer motion to dismiss the case of EMIA v. Krueger. On
February 22, 2011, the tortfeasor Krueger first objected to EMIA’s standing. R. at 24.
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Standing continued to be contested until the case was dismissed in 2014. See Order
Regarding Allocation, February 6, 2015 ; R. at 844.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY
concurred.1
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

CJIl

Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson appeal the trial
court's order awarding a portion of interpleaded funds to
Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA). We reverse
and remand.

1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11201(6).

Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance
BACKGROUND
«.II2
On September 19, 2010, the Wilsons' daughter, Jessica,
was killed after having been struck by a vehicle driven by Cade
Krueger. EMIA, Jessica's insurer, paid nearly $79,000 in medical
expenses on her behalf. No personal representative was sought
or appointed for Jessica's estate.
«.II3
The Wilsons filed a wrongful death claim against Krueger
on January 12, 2011, seeking damages for the loss, love, and
affection of their daughter and for funeral expenses. After
several years of discovery and litigation, the Wilsons reached a
tentative settlement with Krueger's insurer for the $100,000 limit
on his insurance policy.
«.II4
On January 22, 2014, EMIA filed a "Complaint for
Subrogation Claim" against Krueger, seeking reimbursement for
medical expenses it had paid on Jessica's behalf, with accrued
interest. 2 EMIA asserted its subrogation claim pursuant to the
terms of its insurance contract with Jessica. All parties agreed to
consolidate the cases, and Krueger filed an interpleader
counterclaim against both the Wilsons and EMIA, in which his
insurer agreed to interplead the $100,000 policy limit with the
court. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept the $100,000 in
settlement of their claims against Krueger but disagreed as to
how the funds should be distributed. EMIA and the Wilsons
agreed to dismiss Krueger from the lawsuit with prejudice. The
trial court ordered Krueger's insurer to deposit the $100,000 with
the court and gave the parties the opporhmity to file briefs in
support of their competing claims to the funds.

2. EMIA had initially asserted a lien against the Wilsons'
wrongful death claim but later acknowledged that it could not
assert such a lien "against payments to the heirs of a deceased on
a wrongful death claim."
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CjIS
The Wilsons asserted that they were entitled to the entire
$100,000 settlement. They raised a number of arguments in
support of this position, including that they have "superior
equity" over a subrogated insurer and are therefore entitled to
be "made whole" before the insurer is paid, that EMIA had no
legal right to pursue a cause of action against Krueger in its own
name, and that EMIA's action was barred by a three-year statute
of limitations.
CJI6
The trial court ultimately rejected the Wilsons' arguments
and divided the settlement money equally between the Wilsons
and EMIA after finding that each party had incurred damages in
excess of $100,000. However, in acknowledgment that the
Wilsons' efforts to obtain the settlement had been
disproportionate to those of EMIA, the trial court determined
that the Wilsons were entitled to $25,817.69 of EMIA's award to
reimburse them for a portion of their attorney fees. Accordingly,
the trial court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and $24,182.31
to EMIA. The Wilsons now appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
~7

The Wilsons raise a number of arguments in support of
their assertion that the trial court erred in awarding EMIA a
portion of the settlement. Because we agree with the Wilsons
that EMIA lacked standing to bring a subrogation action in its
own name rather than in the name of Jessica or Jessica's estate,
we do not address the Wilsons' other arguments. As this
question involves the interpretation of a statute, as well as
decisional precedents, we review the trial court's ruling for
correctness. See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25,
CJI 9, 134 P.3d 1116 ("A matter of statutory interpretation [is] a
question of law that we review on appeal for correctness."
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted»; In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, CJI 16, 216
P.3d 980 (explaining that "issues that require interpretation of
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prior decisional precedents" are "questions of law that are
reviewed for correctness" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted».
ANALYSIS

ens
Utah's subrogation statute provides, "Subrogation actions
may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-10S (LexisNexis 2014). EMIA asserts that the
use of the word "may" implies that the insurer may bring the
action in the name of the insured but is not required to do so and
may instead choose to bring the action in its own name. See State
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he term
'may' is generally construed to be permissive and not mandatory
. . . ." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted». We
assume, without deciding, that the statute's use of the
permissive "may" allows for the possibility that bringing an
action in the name of the insured is not the exclusive manner for
an insurer to pursue a subrogation claim.3 Nevertheless, the

3. Though we assume for purposes of our analysis that the
permissive "may" applies to the manner in which the insurer
brings the action, i.e., in its own name or in the name of another,
we recognize that the legislature may have intended the word
may" to grant the insurer discretion only as to whether to bring
the action at all. Cf. Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297,
encn 23-24, 243 P.3d 500 (rejecting the assertion that language
providing that I/[a] final action or order of [a municipal
employee] appeal board may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals" could be interpreted as permitting a party to appeal in
another venue, explaining that the language "is not permissive
in the sense that the employee may seek review in the court of
appeals if he likes but may complain in some other judicial
venue if he prefers" but that, "[o]n the contrary, the statute is
(continued ... )
I/
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statute contains no language granting an insurance company the
right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. 4 So even
assuming that bringing an action in the name of the insured is
not, statutorily, the exclusive method for bringing suit, there
must be some legal basis, apart from the statute as currently
written, authorizing the insurer to bring the action in its own
name. Cf. Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1976)
(providing that permissive language in a statute does not
foreclose the right of a person" to pursue a remedy "by any
other means provided by law" (emphasis added». Our review of
Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception of
an insurer who has fully indemnified the insured for all
damages for which the wrongdoer could be held liable, see
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 103 (Utah 1944), no
II

(... continued)
clear that the only court to which the employee may seek initial
recourse . . . is the Utah Court of Appeals" (first alteration in
original».
4. Conversely, the legislature has expressly granted insurers
seeking reimbursement for the payment of workers'
compensation benefits the authority to bring such actions in their
own names:
If compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier:
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party; and
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee,
or the employee's heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis
added).
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independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated
damages in its own name.
Cjf9
First, EMIA does not have a direct cause of action against
Krueger. An insurer's subrogation right to recover from a
responsible third party the amount the insurer paid to or on
behalf of its insured derives from the insurance contract between
the insurer and the insured," and its causes of action against that
third party are limited "to those rights or causes of action that
the insured possesses against the third party." Bakowski v.
Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, <JI 23,52 P.3d 1179. "[E]ven
though the insurance company is subrogated to a part of the
claim of the plaintiff, against the defendant, that does not create
another cause of action and there can only be one suit to recover
on that cause of action." CederlofJ v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780
(Utah 1946).
II

<.II10

Further, "it has been generally held that a suit at law to
enforce [a] right of subrogation must, at common law, be
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance
company in its own name and right." Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R.
Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest.... [A] party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name ...."). liThe reason for the rule is that
the wrongful act" of the third party being sued "is single and
indivisible, and gives rise to but one liability." Johanson, 152 P.2d
at 103. Permitting an insurer to sue in its own name, except
where it has fully indemnified the insured, could compel the
wrongdoer to defend a multitude of suits" against multiple
insurance companies, the insured, and/or the insured's
dependents or heirs. Id.
II

CjI11 Furthermore, "[c]onsiderations of reason and policy impel
the conclusion that the plaintiff, the one who has suffered the
injury and damage, should have basic ownership and control of

20150150-CA

6

2016 UT App 38

Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance
his cause of action." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973).
Even under statutory schemes that give the insurance carrier's
right to reimbursement priority over the injured party's right to
damages,S our supreme court has concluded IIthat the rights
conferred upon the insurance carrier" to pursue an action
against a third party II should be regarded as secondary to the
plaintiff's interest" in controlling the cause of action. Id. Thus, at
least where the insured or the insured's estate retains some
interest in the potential damages, an insurance company cannot
pursue a subrogation action in its own name.
Cj[12 After Jessica'S death, her cause of action for personal
injury passed to her estate by virtue of Utah's survival statute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015)
(" A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer,
does not abate upon the death of the ... injured person.... [T]he
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, [have]
a cause of action against the wrongdoer ...."). The survival
statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured
decedent the right to pursue both "special and general damages"
5. In subrogation actions where the insurer has paid workers'
compensation benefits, such as in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah
1973), the Workers' Compensation Act expressly provides that
the insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the
employee's heirs. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5); see also
Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, cncn 8-13, 96 P.3d 903.
But in a case such as this, where the expenses paid by the insurer
were not connected to a workers' compensation claim, "in the
absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from
a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Hill v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988).
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against the wrongdoer. Id. General damages include damages
for the insured's pain and suffering, Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT
App 218, ~ 16 n.S, 138 P.3d 75, which would have been separate
from the medical expenses paid by EMIA on Jessica's behalf.
Since Jessica's estate would presumably have been entitled to at
least some portion of the damages recoverable in a personal
injury action, EMIA should have brought its personal injury
action in the name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons'
action against Krueger. 6 Instead, it filed an action in its own
name, which Utah law does not permit. Because EMIA lacked
standing to pursue a claim against Krueger in its own name, the
trial court erred in awarding EMIA a portion of the interpleaded
funds.

CONCLUSION
~13

We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a
subrogation action against Krueger in its own name. Thus, the
trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons' settlement with EMIA.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with
instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA's claims and
award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons.

6. EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the
insurer and the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their
respective shares of damages arising from a personal injury
claim. Such an approach would unnecessarily subject the
defendant to multiple suits for the same conduct, see Johanson,
IS2 P.2d at 103, and potentially compromise the heirs' superior
right to recover their share of the personal injury claim, see Hill,
765 P.2d at 866. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 (Utah
1946).
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR. UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo Utah 84601

EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,

COMPLAINT FOR SUBROGATION
CLAIM

Plaintift

-----

Civil No.
Judge _ _ _ __

VB.

CADB M. KRtmOBR, ail individtW; and
lobnDoes 1 through 100,

(Tier two)

Defendants.
COMBS NOW the Plaintift Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA);by and
through its counsel, Smart, Schofield, Shorter" Lunceford, a Professional Corporation, and
complains against Defendants. Cade M. Krueger, an individual. and John Does 1-100 as follows:

1
000775

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

This Complaint involves a demand for reimbursement of medical expenses paid

.

by the Plaintiff on behalf of Jessica Wilson, as a result of an automobile/pedestrian accident,

which occurred in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah.
2..

Plain~ Educators MutuallDsurance Association ("Plaintift"), is a licensed

IDsurance Company qualified to do business in the State of Utah.
3.

Upon information and belie( Defendant Cade M. Krueger, C'Defendant") is a

resident of Utah ~unty. State of Utah.

4.

The 1me names and capacities of Defendants ~obn Does 1 through 100, whether

.

.

individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, are as yet unidentified and unascertained by
Plain~ who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names, and will ask leav~ to

.

.

amend this complaint to show these Defendants' true names and capacities when the same have
been identified and ascertained.
S.
. 6.

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-S-I02.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78B-3-307.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS AND CAUSE OF ACTION

7.

PlaintHfrealleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs .1-6 above.

8.

On or about September
. 19,2010, Jessica Wilson was walldng in a crosswalk on

the campus ofBrlgbam YOUDg University when she was struc~ by a car driven by the Defendant.
9.

Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care caused his vehicle to strike Jessica

W'tlson.
2

coon6

.

10.

Jessica Wilson was severely injured as a result of being struck by Defendant's car

and later passed away.

11.

This accident was the proximate result of Defendant's negligent driving.

12.

Defendant is ~able for all damages arising out oftbis action, including medical

expense incurred by Jessica W'tlson.
13.

At the time of tho accident Jessica Wilson was insured throvgh Plaintifffor

medical expenses.
14.

Plaintiff's medical plan, With Jessica Wilson, which was in effect at the time of

this accident with Defendant, included, under its subrogation and reimbursement section, the

following:
When the Plan Sponsor bas advanced payment of benefits to or on behalf
of a Covered Person for badUy injury actionable at law or for which the
Covered Person may obtain a recovery from a third party, the Plan
acquires both the right of Subrogation against the third PartY and a right of
reimbursement against the Covered Person. [emphasjs addedJ. In such
situations, the Covered Person has the following obligations:

• The Covered Person must reimburse the Plan, up to 1I1e amount of
such benefits advanced or paid by the Plan, out of any recovery
obtained by the Covered PersoD from the third party (or such
- party's Habmty insurance) by judgment, settlement or otherwise,
whether or not the Covered Person is or has been made whole.
The Plan is entitled to the first dollar of any recovery by the
Covered Person and each donar thereafter up to the amount of
benefits advanced or pal$! by the Plan for the injuries to the
.Covered Person that were caused by the thiid party. • The Covered Person cannot limit or avoid such reimbursement
obligation to the Plan by -any agreement with the third party or any
assignment or designation of such proceeds.

3

ooom

• The 'Covered Person must not release or discharge ~ claims that
the Covered Person may have against any potentiaiIy responsible
parties without written permission from the Plan.
• The Covered Person must fully cooperation with the Plan SpoDSor
and Educators. (mcluding, but not limited to, executing aU required
instruments and papers), iftbe Plan chooses to pursue its own right
of Subrogation apinet the third party: the Plan's right of
.
Subrogation is Umited to the amount of benefits advanced or paid
by the Plan to or on bebalfofthe Covered Person as aresu1t ofthe
fault ofthe third party, and the Plan's right to recover such benefits
from the tbird party does not depend gon whether the Covered
Person is made whole by any recoyery. [emphasis added.]

,

IS.

In the medical policy between Plaintiff and Jessica Wilson. Plaintiffis Hsted as

the Plan's sponsor and Jessica Wllson is the Covered Person.
16.

As a IeSUlt of tho automobUe accident caused by Defendant, Plaintiffhas paid

medical tixpenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of $78,692.34. (See payment
history, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Bxh1"it "A,.
.
.
17.· As a result oftha medical payments by Plaintiff on behalf of Jessica WlIson,
Plaintiffis entitlet1 to recover from Defendant the amoUnt ofS78,692.34.
WHBRBFORB, Plain~ Bducators Mutual Insurance Association. pmys for judgment
against Defendant, Cade M. Krueger, ~r the following:
1.

An award ofjudgment in the amount ofS78,692.34;

2.

Interest on speciltl damages, as allowed, both pre-judgment and Post-judgment;

3.

Costs incurred in connection with the bringlng.ofthis action; and

4.

Any other rellefthis Court deems reasonable and proper in this matter.

4
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~ATBD this 220d day of lan~, 2014.

Smart, Schofield, Shorter" Lunceford
A Professional Corporation

~f..~tr

Ran
R. Smart
.
Jeffrey A:. Callister .
Attomeys for Plaintiff .

PIa;., Address:
852 East Arrowhead Lane
~urr,ay,lJtIb 84107
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ADDENDUMC

§ 31A-21 -10S. Subrogation actions, UT ST § 31A-21-10S

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 31a. Insurance Code
Chapter 2 1. Insurance Co ntracts in General
Part 1. General Rules
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-21-108
§ 31A-21-108. Subrogation actions
Currentness

Subrogation actions may be brought by the in surer in the name of it s in sured.

Credits
Laws 1986, c. 204, § 141.

NOles of Decisio ns (15)
U.C.A. 1953 § 3 IA-21-108, UT ST § 3 IA-2 1- 108
C urrenllh rough 20 16 Third Special Session
, - 20[6 "Jh ()I1l~()n H eu!er~ '\J(),.:l;11111 [(l Orl!!lJliLJ
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§ 786-3-107. Surviva l of action fo r inj ury or death t o pe rson, ... , UT ST § 786-3-107

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
Part 1. Actions--Right to Sue and be Sued
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-107
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-11-12
§ 78B-3-107. Survival of action for injury or death to person, upon death of

wrongdoer or injured person--Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket expenses
Currentness

(I)(a) A cause of action arising out o f personal injury to a person, or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence
of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured perSOll. The injured person, or the
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of acti on against the wro ngdoer or the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages, subject to Subsection ( I)(b).

(b) If, prior to judgment or settlement, the injured person dies as a result ora cause o ther th an the injury recei ved as
a result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of the person have a
ca use of action against the wrongdoer or personal representatives of the wrongd oer for spec ial and general damages

which resulted froIll the inju ry caused by the wrongdoer and which occurred prio r 10 death of Ihe injured parly from
the unrelated causc.

(c) If the death of the injured party from an unrelated cause occurs more than six months afte r the incident giving rise

to the claim for damages, the claim shall be limited to special damages unless. prior to the injured party's death:

(i) written notice of intent to hold the wrongdoer responsibl e has been mailed to or served upon the wrongdoer or
the wrongdoe r's insurance ca rrier o r the uninsured motorist ca rrier of the injured party, and proof of mailing or
service ca n be produced upon request; or

(ii) a claim for damages against the wrongdoer or aga in st the uninsured motori st ca rrier of the injured party is the
subject of ongoing negotiations bet wee n th e parties or persons representing the parties or their in surers.

(d) A subseque nt claim against an underinsured motorist carrier for which the injured party was a covered person is

not subject

10

the notice req uiremen t described in Subsection (I)(c).

(e) In no event shall an award of general damages ava ilable under the circumstances described in Subsection ( I )(b) or
( l)(c) aga in st any wrongdoer or any insurer exceed SIOO,OOO regard lcss of avai lable liability , uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicle coverage.

(2) Under Subseclion ( I) neither the injured person nor the personal representati ves or heirs oflh e person who dies may

recover judgment except upon competenl satisfaclory evidence other than the lestimony of the injured person.
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§ 788-3-107 , Survival of action for injury or death to pe rson,.. " UT ST § 788-3-107

(3) This section may not be construed to be retroactive,

Credits
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 683. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2009. c. 293. § I. eff. May 12, 2009: Laws 201 4. c. 220, § I. eff. May 13,
201 4: Laws 20 15. c. 382. § I. eff. Ma y 12, 20 15.

Notes o f Dccisions (4 1)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3- 107, UT ST § 78 B-3- 107
C urrent through 2016 Third Special Sessio n
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RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, UT R Rep Ru le 17

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part IV. Parties
Utah Rul es of Civil Procedure, Rule 17
RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
CUITentness

(a) Real party in interest. Every action sha ll be prosecuted in the name of the real party in int erest. An exec uto r,
ad ministrator, guardi an, bailee, trustee of an exp ress trust, a party with who m or in whose name a con tra ct ha s been
made for the benefit of another, or a party autho rized by statute may sue in th at perso n's name w ith o ut jo ining the party

for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be
brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shan be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
o f the real party in interest until a reaso nable time has been allowed after objecti o n for ratificatio n of com mence ment of
the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interes t; and such ratification, j oinder, o r substitutio n shall
have the same elIect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

(b) Minors or incompetent persons. An un emancipated min or or an insane o r incompete nt person wh o is a pa rty must
appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in th e particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A gua rdian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action
or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represen t the min o r, in sa ne o r incompetent person in the action o r proceeding,
notwith standing that the person may have a genera l guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action
in rem it shall not be necessary to appo int a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be a minor or an
incompetent person.

(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appo inted by a co urt must be appointed as follows:

(c)( I) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if
under that age, upo n the application of a relative o r friend of the mino r.

(c)(2) When th e minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age o f fourteen years and
applies within 21 days after the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so to app ly, then
upon the applicatio n o f a relat ive or friend of the minor, or of any ot her party to th e act io n.

(c)(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon mo tio n therefo r, shall be entitled to an order
designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defenda nt , unless th e defendant or someone in

behalf of the defendant within 21 days after se rvi ce of no tice of such moti on shall cause to be appo inted a guardian fo r
such minor. Service of such notice may be made upo n the defenda nt's ge nera l o r testamentary g uardia n loca ted in the
defen dant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with th e summ o ns in the action , shall be served in the manner
provided for publication of summ o ns upon such min o r, if over fo urteen years of age, or, if under fo urteen years o f age,

WESTLAW

RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, UT R Rep Rul e 17

by such service on the person with whom the min or resides. The g uardian ad litem for such no nresident minor defe ndant
shall have 21 da ys after appointment in which to plead to the ac tio n.

(c)(4) When an insane o r incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding. upo n the applica ti on o f a relative or
friend o f such insane or inco mpetent person, or o f any o ther party to the action o r proceeding.

(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two o r mo rc persons associated in any business either as a
company, a partnership or o ther association, not a corporatio n, tran sact such business under a common
nam e, whether it comprises the names of such associates o r not , they ma y sue or be sued by such co mmo n name. Any
judgment obtained aga in st the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if all
had bee n named pa rti es and had bee n sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an individua l member
of th e associat io n may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the court acquires
jurisdiction over the member.

j oi nt~ s to c k

(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is associated in and conducts
business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that perso n's own name or a commo n trade name, and the
business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superint endent or agent the person may be sued in the person's
name in any action arising out of the conduct of the business.

(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term defendant shall include a re spondent.

Credits
[Amended effective September I, 199 1; April I, 1998; April 1,2007; May I, 2014.]

Editors' Notes

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to the holdin g in COllo/livood Mall Co. v. Sille, 767 P.2d 499 (Uta h 1988),
which allows an unincorporated association to sue in its own name. The rule continues to allow an unincorporated
association to be sued in it s own name. The final sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm that the separate
property of an individual member of an associa tion ma y not be bound by th e judgment unless the member is made a
pa rty.
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule make the termin ology ge nder neutral. In pa rt (c) the word " minor" has
repl aced the wo rd "infant," in order to maintain co nsistency with rece nt changes made in Rule 4(e)(2). In Rule 4 an
infant is defi ned as a person under the age of 14 yea rs, whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to include persons under the
age of 18 years.

Notes of Decisions (94)
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 17, UT R RCP Rule 17
Current with amendments received through September 15,2016.
End
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